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SOME ESSAYS AT OBJECTIVITY* 
by 
Richard Rudner 
Riddle: What is as big as a lox, is shaped like a box, and has wings? 
Answer: A flying lox box. 
-Henny Youngman 
More years ago than it now makes me comfortable to remember, I partici­
pated in an American Philosophical Association symposium on the subjectivity 
of the Social Sciences. Professor May Brodbeck gave that symposium's opening 
paper, and both her paper and mine1 were devoted primarily to attacks on 
theses which F. A. von Hayek had argued in his book The Counter-Revolution of 
Science. 2 In what now seems a paroxism of smugness I, at any rate, must then 
have regarded Hayek as an atavistic isolate propounding "old-hat," reactionary 
doctrines about the Social Sciences-doctrines which, I then obviously thought, 
would surely be regarded by philosophers of science-indeed by all philosophers 
in the analytic tradition-merely as curious anachronisms. 
Smugness turned out to have its foundation in a quite unwarranted ignorance 
of new currents of thought then already stirring. The intervening years have not 
brought ·any change of mind ·about the cogency of Hayek's and related views, but 
they have certainly seen my mind changed about the vitality of such views and 
about their pervasiveness among philosophers who, I had once innocently 
thought, would find them unacceptable. 
My ignorance at the time was rooted in an unawareness that views like those 
of Hayek's were apparently being nurtured by the then relatively subterranean 
streams of Wittgenstein's later thought. When, as in the past few years, those 
streams gave rise to torrents of articles and books-all with a similar burden 
concerning the special pos.ition of what may be called the language of mentation 
and, implicitly or explicitly, the special inaccessibility of social and psychological 
phenomena (including linguistic acts) to scientific investigation-my smugness in 
construing views like Hayek's as cranky anachronisms was, of course, shattered. 
I speak of Wittgenstein as being lhe apparent or better, the alleged "father" 
of these "torrents" because, despite the overt and covert claims for his paternity 
made in many of these writings, I am not wholly convinced by my understanding 
of some of Wittgenstein's views on langµage, to credit the claims. Indeed, my im­
pression is that his work does not have as consequence the alleged, peculiar 
imperviousness of social phenomena. But I have no intention of making this a 
paper about Wittgenstein. The continuation of the particular gambit concerning 
who is responsible for these views is one that the fo11owing discussion will 
resolutely decline. We forego arguments about whether the baby should be 
*Au future publication righ ts reserved by the author. 
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deposited on Wittgenstein's doorstep. All we want to do is take a very close 
look at the baby. 
The gist of Hayek's conclusions in The Counter-Revolution of Science was 
that social phenomena (hereafter I shall use this term to embrace what is referred 
to usually by most uses of either the term 'social' or. the term 'psychological') 
are not amenable to investigation by the method of science-a method which he 
believed appropriate, at most, to non-social phenomena-and that social phenom­
ena require a special, radically distinct, methodology for their investigation. 
Of course, major assaults on the efficacy or objectivity of scientific study of 
social phenomena have been immensely varied in vitality, interest and plausi­
bility. I am especially concerned with those positions which take a form that 
may be described as a denial of the unity of scientific method-those which I 
have categorized elsewhere as separatist positions. 3 Under the rubric of method­
ological separatism I lump all those positions which have in common their 
denial that the methodology applicable to the other sciences is applicable to 
the social sciences. There are, alas, a great many such positions; their denials are 
variously couched and variously grounded. Historicists, sociologists of knowl­
edge, are perenially with us; radical or activist anti-theoreticians, and hermeneu­
ticists, present views which currently gain interest or favor. Each of these major 
positions, no doubt, deserves a detailed scrutiny. In the present essay, however, 
my attention will be focused only obliquely on these positions-and only insofar 
as they are related to still another major separatist position which has evidenced 
extraordinary vitality since it was given relatively definitive form in Peter 
Winch's misnamed book, 1'he Idea of a Social Science. 
The position Winch elucidates is one which explicitly credits the influence of 
Wittgenstein, but it obviously shares many tenets with the other separatist 
positions just mentioned, and it patently, in tum, has influenced subsequent 
writers. I have found Winch's arguments in his book as powerful and subtle as 
any put forward by contemporary proponents of like doctrines. But I am 
especially interested in examining his views since they bear rather heavily upon 
some even more general problems which are of pivotal importance in current 
analytic philosophy-problems associated with the notions of adequate trans­
lation and translatability. 
The discussion which follows, then, is divided into three main sections. In the 
first section I have tried to prepare the way for later making some of the issues 
sharper by considering the relevance of familiar distinctions between technique 
and method in Science and between the contexts of discovery and validation. 
In the second section I consider arguments about the relevance of causal expla­
nation (or causal description) and the relevance of scientifically verifiable 
theories to the investigation of social phenomena. Finally I examine briefly the 
relevance of results which have been achieved on problems of translatability by 
such people as Quine and others for assessing certain of the claims that Winch 
makes. 
Part I 
It is important at the outset to see that the sort of claim being made about 
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social science by separatists is quite different from certain much less radical 
claims that have been made about the difference between the ways in which 
social phenomena and non-social phenomena may be studied. For example, it 
has often been held (too often considering its banality) that specific techniques 
of observation or experimentation or of experimental control which are applic­
able to phenomena of Physics are inapplicable to phenomena of, say, social 
psychology. But it is clear that Winch's kind of thesis about social phenomena 
amounts by no means to the banal observation that sociologists aren't able to 
accelerate what they label 'Cambridge Dons' in cyclotrons. 
To have become aware that various scientific disciplines employ various and 
varying techniques of investigation is not to have become aware of anything 
significant about the methodological character of social science. It is not, for 
example, at all obvious that the social sciences differ more, in technique, from 
non-social sciences than do the non-social sciences differ among themselves. What 
grounds, for instance, could be adduced to support the claim that use of a 
telescope in astronomy is more different from the use of a one-way mirror in 
small-group research than it is from, say, the use of a bathysphere? Not only are 
there differences in technique among non-social science disciplines as vast, or 
striking, or marked, as those between the non-social sciences and the social 
sciences, but also there are differences of techniques employed among the sub­
disciplines of a single discipline or within even a single sub-discipline in different 
epochs, which are as great as can easily be thought of. 
The point of rehearsing such relatively familiar considerations is not only to 
emphasize that the separatist thesis about the difference between investigations 
of social and non-social phenomena, must not be construed as a trivial one con­
cerning differences in technique, but also to emphasize that adducing differences 
of technique will not per se provide any evidence for the distinction the , 
separatist is claiming. 
The distinction Winch, for example , is claiming is a distinction of method 
and not of technique. He believes that he establishes by his arguments that 
" . . .  the understanding of society is logically different from the understanding 
of nature . . . "4, and that an acquisition of the former requires a different 
methodology from that which is required for an acquisition of the latter-that is 
to say, it .requires not different techniques of inquiry but a different logic of 
inquiry. 
Winch's claim, as is indeed quickly patent to his readers who are familiar with 
the literature, belongs to that area of philosophical interest which Reichenbach 
used to call "the Context of Validation" or "the Context of Justification" in 
Science. And this brings us to the second of the two distinctions which helps us 
sharpen the issue; namely, the distinction between the "Context of Validation" 
and the "Context of Discovery." For while it is important to see not only that 
what is at issue is a thesis about logics of inquiry or methodologies rather than 
about techniques, it is equally important to see that problems of the methodolo­
gy or of the logic of scientific inquiry belong to the context of validation. No 
one, in fact, has demonstrated that there is such a thing as a logic of discovery. 
On the other hand, a logic, or methodology, of validation, of explanation and 
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prediction, is precisely what is being referred to when it is asserted that regard­
less of differences in technique of observation or experiment the scientific 
method is pervasive through all the sciences, or the scientific method is applicable 
in the investigation of social as well as non-social phenomena. It is precisely this 
logic of validation, explanation, prediction, which is being referred to when 
Winch claims then, on the contrary, that the methodology of the non-social 
science is not applicable to the investigation of social phenomena. 
Now, in general, the context of validation is the context o f  our concern when 
we raise questions or confront problems connected with validating or justifying 
the acceptance or rejection of some scientific hypothesis or theory regardless of 
how we have come to discover or entertain that hypothesis or theory. To the 
context of discovery, on the other hand, belong such questions as how, in fact, 
docs one come to "latch on" to good hypotheses?; or, what social, psychological, 
political, or economic conditions will conduce to the discovery or "the thinking 
up," of fruitful hypotheses by scientists? In short the issues or questions which 
are appropriate to the context of discovery are, themselves, substantive issues or 
questions in the social sciences. They are, for example, questions to be answered 
by the Sociology, or Psychology, or History of Science rather than by the 
Philosophy of Science. The question of how Harvey came to think of the hypo­
thesis of the circulation of the blood is a substantive question of the History of 
Science. The question of whether this hypothesis has been sufficiently confirmed 
by the evidence amassed for it is obviously a quite different question (and one of 
the easier ones), belonging to the Philosophy of Science. 
Again, I emphasize this elementary and familiar point because it helps make 
clear at least one aspect of what has otherwise been a fairly murky region of 
controversy. In particular we can see that this claim (that the social and non­
social sciences are methodologically different) cannot rest upon or be bolstered 
by any examples or arguments which purport to show either the relative in­
accessibility to observation of social phenomena, or the difficulties of construct­
ing social theories that might result from the relative complexity or obscurity of 
social phenomena. 
Thus, c-0nsider an argument representative of those given by many people 
who hold that what they call "the methods of the natural sciences" are not 
applicable to social phenomena. Suppose, their argument goes, that a Martian 
were suddenly deposited on earth; suppose, moreover, that the first thing he 
witnesses is a social act consisting of a man voting Labor in a general election. 
It is argued by separatists that however well the Martian might be able to 
describe the purely physical characteristics of this event or explain it as a 
physical event, he could never explain or describe any of its peculiarly social 
aspects; for, the meaningfulness of the event, the very thing, it is held, which 
makes it a social phenomenon at all, would be irremedially lost to him. 
Now, I quite understand that examples and claims of this kind have important 
and subtle ramifications for a variety of issues in the philosophy of social 
science-some of these, but certainly not all, I shall be addressing below. For the 
moment, however, I am concerned with the example, and the concomitant 
claims made for it, only as these may be seen to bear upon a somewhat more 
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superficial feature of the complex problems that are suggested. I restrict myself 
here, in fad, to what is the import of the example for the Context of Discovery. 
In just this sense, then, it should be noted that we are being confronted in the 
example with what is actually an empirical hypothesis in the Sociology of 
Science. An empirical hypothesis about the psychology of Martians-or, perhaps, 
more generally about the limitations of alien imaginations. The example itself 
hypothesizes that creatures of certain kinds of cultures or backgrounds will be 
psychologically incapable of thinking up certain kinds of hypotheses. 
Of course, there is no good scientific evidence which would scientifically 
warrant the acceptance of such a hypothesis about Martians. Indeed, there is 
surely not yet extant any sound body of psychological or sociological. theory 
which makes the concepts in which the hypothesis itself is couched very precise. 
But suppose one waives all' such impediments to the scientific acceptability of 
this hypothesis about the limitations of alien imaginations. Suppose the hypo­
thesis about Martian psychology to be true. What is important to note is that 
this would at most establish that the investigation of social phenomena by an 
alien is technically very difficult to accomplish or, even, empirically impossible-­
Le. contrary to psychological law. Nevertheless, to infer from this, supposing it 
to be established, that the methodology-the logic of validation-of the social 
sciences must be radically distinct from the methodology of the non-social 
sciences is simply to be guilty of a non sequitur. And just this has been my point 
in this section. I am tempted to assert a fortiori that if Winch's thesis of 
methodological distinctness is not, logically, capable of being: bolstere(i by even 
the sort of example just adduced, then no instance from the context of 
Discovery can bolster it. 
Part II 
Although I have been concerned to begin by emphasizing the point that 
Winch's thesis is about methodology, it should not be thought that this by 
itself tells against Winch or that he is unconscious of the point. On the contrary, 
the explicit overall structure of Winch's argument involves, first, an attempt to 
show that Philosophy, or at any rate, Epistemology is activity that is method­
odologically distinct from Science (Chapter 1), and second, an attempt to sihow 
that Sociology, as the discipline concerned with "the nature of social phenomena 
in general," as the discipline which has as its "central problem . . .  that of giving 
an account of social phenomena in general, itself belongs to philosophy" 
(pp. 42-43). Winch claims indeed that this field of social science "is really mis­
begotten epistemology . . . . 'misbegotten' because its problems have been 
largely misconstrued, and therefore mishandled, as a species of scientific 
problem" (p. 43). To substantiate this conclusion he tri es to show that the 
entire paraphernalia of scientific validation (including, e.g., the empirical testing 
of theories containing lawlike sentences-sentences testable through their uses 
in explanation and prediction), is irrelevant to the problem of giving an account 
of, or coming to an understanding of, the kind of behavior he calls "meaningful 
behavior." Meaningful behavior is a kind of behavior which he takes to be not 
merely coextensional with social phenomena but also to constitute its very 
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essence. Moreover, since he takes linguistic behavior to exemplify,par excellence, 
meaningful behavior (though by no means to exhaust it), a great deal of his 
argument is specifically focused on the nature of linguistic behavior and upon 
showing that application of scientific method to its study is "misbegotten." 
What are the arguments which Winch advances to support this extraordinary 
conclusion? First of all, the term 'meaningful behavior' is defined or, at least, 
analyzed by Winch in terms of the concept, 'rule governed behavior'. He believes 
that for an event to constitute a social phenomenon it must be a meaningful act 
or event and, indeed, conversely. Moreover, for it to be a meaningful act or 
event-such as, paradigmatically, a bit of lingilistic behavior is-it must be rule­
govemed (p. 52). But what does it mean for any behavior to be rule governed? 
Well, it does not mean that the agent who is manifesting the meaningful or rule­
govemed behavior need to attributing a "sense" or need have a "subjective 
intention" or "subjective direction" for his action (p. 4 7). The agent need have 
no "conscious motive" nor any conscious "reason" nor any "reason" at all for 
his action (p. 48). In fact, a meaningful action may well be a merely habitual one 
(pp. 57ff) . 
On the other hand when an act is rule governed or meaningful or has a sense 
it is the kind of act which "commits" to other acts-not as cause of these other 
acts but as symbol of them-it symbolizes them. Winch says, "Action with a 
sense is symbolic: it goes together with certain other actions in the sense that it 
commits the agent to behaving in one way rather than another in the future." 
(p. 50) The notion of an act commiting to another act is, Winch claims, 
"identical in form with the connection between a definition and the subsequent 
use of the word defined." (p. 50) It follows, he tells us, "that I can only be 
committed in the future by what I do now if my present act is the application of 
a rule. " (p. 50) Moreover, just as one need not have a "conscious motive�' nor 
any "reason " for one's act in order for it to qualify as ruie governed, so one 
also need not consciously applying any rule. Winch claims that "the test of 
whether a man's actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can 
formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a 
wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does. Where that makes 
sense, then it must also make sense to say that he is applying a criterion in 
what he does even though he does not, and perhaps cannot, formulate that 
criterion." (p. 58) 
The elucidation here, of rule-governed or meaningful behavior in terms 
ultimately of behavior about which there is some point in saying that it was 
right or it was wrong, is in apposition with Winch's earlier interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's analysis of what it is to follow a rule. On this interpretation the 
notion of following a rule is said to be "logically inseparable from the notion of 
making a mistake. If it is possible to say of someone that he is following a rule 
that means that one can ask whether he is doing what he does correctly or not." 
(p. 32) And just what is it, on this view to make a mistake? Well, "A mistake is a 
contravention of what is established as correct; as such, it must be recognizable 
as such a contravention. That is, if I make a mistake in, say, my use of a word, 
other people must be able to point it out to me. If this is not so, I can do what I 
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like and there is not external check on what I do; that is, nothing is established." 
(p. 32) 
Throughout the book, Winch bulwarks both this analysis of meaningful 
behavior as rule.governed or corrigible behavior and of its being the diff erentia of 
social behavior, by the marshalling of copious illustrations and the refutation of 
many putative counter-examples. While Winch's discussion by no means clears 
up difficulties about the meaning of 'rule' I shall take his analysis, adequately 
illuminating for the present issue; it is not my intention, at any rate in this 
essay, to challenge it. It is rather with his contention that social phenomena, 
thus identified, are not amenable to scientific investigation that I am concerned 
to quarrel. 
I have claimed that in maintaining that social phenomena are inaccessible to 
the scientific method Winch is explicitly aware of offering an argument in the 
Context of Validation. He makes this quite clear in a number of passages 
scattered through the book. Thus, he speaks of the case he has been presenting 
as one which says "that the understanding of society is logically different from 
the understanding of nature . . .  " (p. 119). In another place, he berates Weber 
for thinking "that the kind of 'law' which the sociologist may formulate to 
account for the behavior of human beings is logically no different from a 'law' 
in natural science." (p. 117) In still another passage on the Weberian notion of 
Verstehen and on some of its critics, he shows that he is aware of the precise 
relevance to his own argument of the distinctions between techniques of inquiry 
and methods or logics of inquiry, and between the Context of Discovery and 
the Context of Validation (pp. lllff); and he accepts, indeed insists on, these 
distinctions in the arguments which follow. Challenging the tenability of these 
distinctions, consequently, is scarcely a recourse open to Winch or to those who 
argue like him that a different methodology is appropriate to social science. 
Accordingly, I shall take these distinctions, as characterized in the first section 
of this essay, to have been sufficiently established for the purposes of the 
present discussion and shall employ them in what follows without any further 
attempt to defend or substantiate them. 
His central thesis that an "understanding" of social or meaningful phenomena 
requires a logic of inquiry radically distinct from that appropriate to non-social 
phenomena, involves two main themes or general lines of argument. These two 
themes constantly reappear in Winch's treatment. Moreover, the two are so 
tightly intertwined or entangled in some of the examples and discussions that 
one sometimes gains the strong impression that Winch's failure to disengage them 
stems from his not seeing that they are two different lines of argument. They 
are, to be sure, closely connected themes insofar as they both issue in an insis­
tence that the social scientist unlike the "natural" scientist must work from 
inside the domain he studies. Nevertheless the two are separable themes-at 
least insofar as they appea.r to depend on different sorts of grounds for their 
support. Again, though Winch presents many different specific arguments for 
the separatist thesis-usually in connection with attempts at refuting diverse 
objections to it-all of these specific arguments though appear to have in 
common one or the other or both of these more general themes or lines of 
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argument as their chief burden. I think it is fair to say that if it can be shown 
that these themes or general lines of argument are unsound, or even that there 
is no good reason for believing them to be sound, we will have shown that 
Winch's kind of separatism need not be credited. 
I'm afraid neither of the two can be described in very brief compass. I shall 
consider each of them in a separate section, and hope that you have a clear 
enough notion of them at the end of each of the sections. The first theme, then, 
involves concepts that Winch employs again and again at crucial junctures in 
his discussion but that are nowhere given any definitive analysis by him; I mean, 
the related notions of understanding a social phenomenon and of a phenom· 
enon 's being intelligible. 
It is, of course, hard to cavil at Winch's unclarified assumption that the aim 
of any science is the provision of an understanding of its subject matter-or, 
more specific3.lly, that the aim of any scientist qua scientist is to gain an under. 
standing of the phenomena he investigates. This surely seems an innocuous 
enough admission. But Winch makes it the foundation of the first theme or line 
of argument. With a basis on this specific foundation taken for granted as a 
first step, the line of argument employed proffers us a second step that seems 
equally harmless; namely, that a phenomenon can be said to be understood if 
and only if' it is intelligible. I must admit that the next step now taken, step 
three, which appears in several guises and in various contexts, is a bit dazzling 
when it is held up nakedly for examination. In, perhaps, its most compelling 
form, it goes like this: if a phenomenon is a meaningful one (i.e. if it is a rule 
governed or social phenomenon) then it is not intelligible wnless its meaning 
can be understood. Now, if we remember that understanding the "sense" or 
the "meaning" of a rule governed act or event consists in "knowing what it is to 
follow the rule" which in tum is identical with knowing how to construe the 
act as right or wrong, correct or incorrect, contravening something established 
or not contravening it, then the conclusion seems almost inevitable. 
I say "almost," because one more nail remains to be driven home. To avoid a 
reductio Winch needs to have shown that although understanding the phenomena 
it investigates is the aim of any field of investigation still different kinds of 
understanding are appropriate to different kinds of investiga tion. The kind of 
understanding appropriate to a physical·science investigation is not the kind 
appropriate to a philosophical-in particular, an epistemological-investigation­
and specifically an epistemological investigation of conformance to linguistic or, 
indeed, any other kind of rule. The kind of understanding appropriate to 
physical sciience investigations, he appears to concede, may be gained through 
the acquisition of nomological explanations of such phenomena-that is, through 
the logical .subsumption of statements describing them under general scientific 
laws-through the confirmation of theories containing such laws and employed 
to make successful predictions. But the understanding thus acquired, he claims, 
is obviously not the kind of understanding sought in philosophical investigation­
an area in which talk of seeking nomological or causal explanations is simply 
misconceived. In fact, the kind of understanding appropriate to the philosophical 
investigations relevant here, that is to epistemological investigations of what 
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it is to follow some rule, is constituted precisely of coming to know or under­
stand or learn the rule, i.e., coming to know, or understand, or learn what 
behavior contravenes it and what behavior does not. Since this, in turn, is 
precisely the desideratum in the investigation of all meaningful behavior, i.e. 
all social phenomena, we are apparently forced to the long signalled conclusion 
that the aim of social science which is, of course, to understand social 
phenomena, can only be a philosophical aim, can only be consummated by the 
achievement of what is par excellence a philosuphical kind of understanding 
rather than through a patently inappropriate "natural science" kind of under­
standing. It is simply a corollary that the methodology appropriate to philosoph­
ical investigations is distinct from that appropriate to what we may call causal 
investigations. At the same time a reductio, suggested by uses of 'understanding' 
and 'intelligibility' in connection with step 2, to the effect that all scientific 
investigations turn out to be philosophical investigations, is avoided by the 
establishment (and this is made the first order of business-being attended to in· 
chapter 1) of the fact that there are different kinds of understandings. 
Let me recapitulate the steps, in severely telescoped form for ease of 
recollection: 
1. The aim of any investigation is an understanding of the phenomena 
investigated . 
2. A phenomenon is susceptible of being understood if and only if it is 
intelligible. 
3. A meaningful phenomenon is not intelligible unless its meaning can be 
understood. 
: • a) Understanding social phenomena presupposes understanding their meanings. 
:. 8 )  The methodology appropriate to the social sciences is radically distinct 
from the methodology of the non-social sciences. 
This line of argument or theme occurs, as I indicated, in various guises, more or 
less truncated, at a number of junctures. There is one particular juncture, indeed, 
which is pivotal in the book, and examining the argument as it occurs at that 
point will furnish the opportunity of stalking the beast in its native habitat. 
The example in question is one in which J. S. Mill is being taken to task for 
holding that the methodology of investigations of social institutions is the same 
as that employed in the "natural" sciences. Winch lays the groundwork fo:r his 
attempted refutation of Mill by first pointing out that when we say a "natural" 
scientist has come to an understanding of the phenomena he is investigating we 
are committed to holding that he stands in two sorts of relationship. One is a 
relationship to his fellow scientists and their's and his mutually rule governed 
behavior-behavior by virtue of which alone he can be said to have achieved an 
understanding. For to say, e.g., that he has confirmed a generalization or a 
statement of uniformity presupposes that he has made "judgments of identity" 
(p. 83). It presupposes some judgment of identity because "a regularity or 
uniformity is the constant recurrence of the same kind of event on the same kind 
of occasion." (p. 83) Now, Winch believes he has already amply demonstrated 
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(and for the present purposes I shall not question this belief) that judgments of 
identity in a given context-that is, judgments of what are to count as referents 
in using terms like 'same' or 'the same'-are themselves particularly important 
types of rule-governed behavior. In this case the first relationship, being claimed 
by Winch to hold between or among a "natural" scientist (when he investigates 
qua scientist) and his fellow scientists, is that of being a co-participant in what 
might be called the langll!age-game of the science. The second! relationship is one 
he stands in to the phenomena being investigated. Such phenomena present 
themselves to him "as an object of study; he observes them and notices certain 
facts about them.'' (p. 85) 
According to Winch, if Mill is correct in holding the methodology of 
investigations of social institutions to be the same as that of the natural 
sciences, then the social scientist's case, respecting these two kinds of relation­
ship will be identical with the case of the "natural scientist." Winch tells us­
and I had better quote the relevant passage at length-that 
On Mill's account, understanding a social institution consists in observing 
regularities in the behaviour of its participants and expressing these regular­
ities in the form of generalizations. Now if the position of the sociological 
investigator (in a broad sense) can be regarded as comparable, in its main 
logical outlines, to that of the natural scientist, the following must be the 
case. The concepts and criteria according to which the sociologist judges rthat, 
in two situations, the same thing has happened, or the same action performed, 
must be understood in relation to the rules governing sociological investiga­
tion. But here we run against a difficulty; for whereas in the case of the 
natural scientist we have to deal with only one set of rules, namely those 
governing the scientist's investigation itself, here what the sociologfst is 
studying, as well as his study of it, is a hu�an activity and is therefore 
carried on according to rules. And it is these rules, rather than those which 
govern the sociologist's investigation, which specify what is to count as 
'doing the same kind of thing' in relation to that kind of activity. 
An example may make this clearer. Consider the parable of the Pharisee and 
the Publican (Luke, 18, 9). Was the Pharisee who said 'God, I thank Thee 
that I am not as other men are' doing the s.ame kind of thing as the Publican 
who prayed 'God be merciful unto me a sinner'? To answer this one would 
have to start by considering what is involvep in the idea of prayer; and that 
is a religious question. In other words, the appropriate criteria for deciding 
whether the actions of these two men were of the same kind or not belong to 
religion itself. Thus t!he sociologist of religion will be confronted with an 
answer to the question : Do these two acts belong to the same kind of 
activity?; and this answer is given according to criteria which are not taken 
from sociology, but from religion itself. 
But if the sociologist of religion's judgments of identity-and hence his 
generalizations-rest on criteria taken from religion, then his relation to the 
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performers of religious activity cannot be just that of observer to observed. 
It must rather be analogous to the participation of the natural scientist 
with his fellow-workers in the activities of scientific investigation. Putting 
the point generally, even if it is legitimate to speak of one's understanding 
of a mode of social activity as consisting in a knowledge of regularities, the 
nature of this knowledge must be very different from the nature of knowl­
edge of physical regularities . . .  
This point is reflected in such common-sense considerations as the following: 
that a historian or sociologist of religion must himself have some religious 
feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying and 
understand the considerations which govern the lives of its participants. A 
historian of art must have some aesthetic sense if he is to understand the 
problems confronting the artists of his period; and without this he will have 
left out of his account precisely what would have made it a history of art, as 
opposed to a rather puzzling external account of certain motions which 
certain people have been perceived to go through. 
I do not wish to maintain that we must stop at the unreflective kind of 
understanding of which I gave as an instance the engineer's understanding of 
the activities of his colleagues. But I do want to say that any more reflective 
understanding must necessarily presuppose, if it is to count as genuine under­
standing at all, the participant's unreflective understanding. And this in itself 
makes it misleading to compare it with the natural scientist's understanding 
of his scientific data. (pp. 86-89) 
The portentious character of the thesis Winch purports to be demonstrating 
or illustrating in this passage should not be underestimated. He believes that the 
argument given here, and similar ones, show that Mill is wrong in regarding "all 
explanations as fundamentally of the same logical structure" (p. 71) and that 
Mill is wrong in believing "that there can be no fundamental logical difference 
between the principles according lo which we explain natural changes and those 
according to which we explain social changes." 
What has now been outlined above is, perhaps, sufficient to convey both the 
import of what I've called Winch's first line or argument as well as something of 
the flavor of his style of argument. It is now time to turn to a more direct 
evaluation of his argument. 
To those acquainted with Michael Oakeshott's essays on politics and political 
behavior collected in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 5 Winch's uses of 
terms like "unreflective understanding" will very likely have struck a familiar 
chord. Winch's employment of such terms is no accident. AJthough he has a 
relatively minor disagreement with Oakeshott about whether habitual behavior 
is rule-governed behavior (and thus requires the possibility of the kind of 
reflectiveness appropriate to understanding rule-governed behavior) he is for 
the most part self-consciously in agreement with Oakeshott's general thesis about 
what might be called the primacy, or the fundamental character, of unreflective 
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knowledge in coming to the sort of understanding appropriate to investigations 
of social phenomena. 
Whatever the profundity or complexity of the views which Oakeshott and 
Winch build on the distinction between reflective and unreflective understanding 
(and independently of the finer shades of difference between them) the 
distinction itself seems simple-mindedly straightforward. It resembles closely 
both that venerable friend of ours, the distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge about, and also a somewhat newer friend, the 
_ distinction between knowing that and knowing how. Consider how it is that we 
may come to have knowledge of, or an understanding of, driving a motor car on 
English roads, to use one of Oakeshott's examples (op. cit., p. 7). No amount 
of studying the rules, or laws, or descriptions of the relevant activities can 
substitute for actual driving. More precisely {though I a:m not sul'P. th.at 
Oakeshott sees this). these cannot substitute for the actual experience-of. 
driving. The reason for this, in the final analysis, if J may abort a rather tedious 
recital, is that when in certain contexts we refer to a knowledge, or an under­
standing, of driving on English roads, we are in such contexts making an essential 
reference to such experie·nces-we would in such contexts witthhold application 
of the predicate 'knows how to drive on English roads' from any individual who 
had not had such experiences. The difference between reflective and unreflective 
knowledge of how to stop a motor car is precisely the straightforward one that 
the latter necessarily includes experience of handling a car, for example, ex­
perience of treading on a brake pedal. 
Now, I do not wish to deny that there are varying shades of difference among 
all the many dichotomies I have been mentioning. Nor do I want even to deny 
that the differences may come to be significant in seeing the differences among 
the overall views of, say, Russell, Ryle, Winch, and Oakeshott. But whatever 
their significance in such a more comprehensive connection, these differences 
are not important here. I shall be concerned only with a characteristic which all 
the dichotomies have in common. What they all have in common is the delinea· 
tion of an opposition between what we may call direct experiences of objects or 
events on the one hand, and more indirect relationships to such events, such as 
formulating or reading descriptions of such events, on the other. 
With respect to the "natural sciences" there is surely now general agreement 
that a scientific understanding of things or events of a given kind does not 
necessarily presuppose direct experience of such things or events. Indeed, as 
Winch himself points out, we have acquired the understanding appropriate in 
"natural science" when we have, say, a nomological explanation of the event 
being investigated. 
Still, there have always been philosophers (Bergson, and Whitehead if I 
correctly understand him, are notable examples) who, while agreeing that 
attainment of scientific explanation of, say, physical phenomena, is as much 
as can be attained by physical science in the �ay of understanding such 
phenomena, have nevertheless taken this to be symptomatic of the deficiency 
or limitations of the scientific method in general-even as employed in physics. 
A typical claim in this vein is one to the effect that science distorts through 
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abstraction from physical reality. It is held, for example,  that a scientific 
description of a tornado conveys in only a feeble, truncated, wretchedly poor 
manner what is conveyed with overpowering richness and fullness by the direct 
experience of a tornado. 
Nowadays, few of us are so analytically naive as to be taken in by this kind of 
view about deficiencies or limitations alleged to characterize science. We, most of 
us at any rate, comprehend the point of Einstein's remark that "it is not the 
function of Science to give the taste of the soup." [t is the function of science to 
describe the world, not to reproduce it. Of course a description of a tornado does 
not provide us with a tornado; it is not the same thing as a tornado! And, 
incidentally, the description does not fail to be a tornado on account of being 
incomplete, or truncated, or generalized. Even if it were a "complete" 
description of a tornado-whatever that might be-it would still be a description 
of a tornado and not a tornado. Moreover, a description of a tornado no more 
fails to be a tornado than does a tornado fail to be a description. No, it should 
be clear enough that to allege deficiencies or limitations to science in the 
above fashion is simply to be mistaken or confused in a particularly egregious 
way about the nature of science. To be sure, if we are good scientists and if we 
are lucky, we can use our scientific descriptions to help lead us to the exper­
iences we desire of the extra-linguistic world-but, to expect those descriptions 
to be the extra-linguistic world or even to be very much like it, obviously mis· 
construes the enterprise. And really, to make such a mistake is to commit a kind 
of solecism very much like "accusing" my eyeglasses of failing, or of being 
defective, because they do not have enough thrust to propel an Apollo space 
capsule to the moon. 
I have not been able to resist dubbing the fallacious view that the function of 
science is to reproduce reality the r'eproductive fallacy. 
This is all very well; but how exactly, you are doubtless wondering, does it 
bear upon Winch's line of argument about social phenomena? The answer is, I 
believe, that Winch's argument commits a somewhat subtle form of the repro· 
ductive fallacy; and having elucidated the latter in the neutral context of tne 
physical sciences enables me to deal much more succinctly with Winch's 
argument. 
The commission of the fallacy does not, I think, lie in Winch's contention that 
social phenomena are rule governed phenomena, nor, of course, in his seeing that 
an investigation of rule governed phenomena does, itself, constitute a rule 
governed phenomenon. Nor, does it lie in his seeing, quite correctly, that the 
sorts of rule governed phenomena constituted of, say, religious activity or 
religious institutions are broadly of the same kind as the rule governed 
phenomena constituted by an attempt to verify some causal theory through an 
explanatory or predictive use of it. But we do get a commission of a species of 
the reproductive fallacy when, granting all this, it is inferred that the only 
methodology appropriate to the investigation of a rule governed phP.nomenon is 
one that issues in a reproduction of the condition it investigates. 
Suppose, for want of a better, we employ the term 'teleology of the observer' 
to refer to the relevant characteristics of the scientists' "game"-including the 
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verificational canons, instances of conformance to them, the conceptual 
apparatus of nomological or causal theories, explanatory uses of these, predictive 
uses of these, etc. And, correspondingly, suppose we use the term 'teleology of 
the observed' to refer to relevant characteristics of some social phenomena (e.g., 
religious behavior) which we wish to investigate. What Winch, and others who 
hold similar views, are claiming then is that the only way in which such a social 
science investigation can achieve understanding is via the adoption by the social 
scientist of the teleology of the observed. 
But this surely is an idea of no social science. It is, logically, the same as 
claiming that the only understanding appropriate to investigation of tornados is 
that which is gained in the experience of tomados; and anyone who put forward 
the idea that the only kind of understanding at which we should, or could, aim 
in connection with the investigation of tornados be confined to whatever 
understanding comes to us in the experiencing of tornados, would be having an 
idea of no Meteorology. Notice that in rejecting Winch's thesis, it is not necessary 
to deny that some sort of knowledge or understanding of, say religion, is gained 
in "playing" the religious "game" any more than it is necessary to deny that 
some sort of knowledge or understanding is gained in experiencing tornados 
or in driving on English roads. The point is that nothing whatever in such a 
concession implies that these "direct" understandings are the only possible ones; 
nor would such a concession imply that the scientist's "game"-the adoption of 
the teleology of the observer-is at all inappropriate for achieving the sort of 
understanding, a quite different one to be sure, which it is the function of 
successful scientific investigation to provide. 
Again, notice that the mere fact that both the observed and the observer in 
social science investigations are rule governed, the fact that the teleology of the 
observed and the teleology of the observer are both teleologies, does not per se 
demonstrate that the teleologies must be identical. No more than does the fact 
that both verbal inscriptions describing tornados, and also tornados, have mass, 
demonstrate that inscriptions are tornados. 
In sum, Winch's argument here exemplifies what might as well be termed the 
'fat cow-herd' sub-species of the reproductive fallacy. This conclusion is also 
supported by a close look at the third step in the main line of argument which 
was presented above. The third step you will remember was given in the claim 
that 
3. A meaningful phenomenon is not intelligible unless its meaning is 
understandable. 
Now, the truistic second step presumably sanctions our replacement of 'intelli­
gible' in 3 by 'understandable' thereby yielding 
3'. A meaningful phenomenon is not understandable unless its meaning is 
understandable. 
But the transformation of 3 into 3' makes quite patent, in the light of the con-
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siderations we have already adduced, Lhe. equivocation on the notion of under­
standable which is embodied in the step. 
I have not denied that one kind of understanding of a social, or meaningful, or 
rule-governed, phenomenon consists in understanding its meaning in the sense 
of playing th.e "game" relative to which it has that meaning. In this sense, indeed, 
understanding the meaning is identical with playing the "game" which in tum, 
of course, is identical in this context with following the rules of the game. But 
there is no reason whatever for believing that this sort of understanding is the 
only sort of understanding of meaningful phenomena possible, nor any reason 
whatever for believing that it is the sort of understanding appropriate to 
scientific investigation of social phenomena. In short, for Winch's 3rd step to be 
acceptable, its two occurrences of 'understandable' must be univocal, and must 
carry the sense of direct understanding just outlined. But if 'understandable' 
carries this sense in its occurrences in step 3, then it must be equivocal 
relative io its occurrences in step 2 or step 1 which depended on a sense of the 
term not thus restricted for their plausibility or acceptability as truistic. On the 
other hand, if the two occurrences of 'understandable' in step 3 are equivocal 
relative to each other then 3 is not acceptable as true. In neither case, therefore, 
does the line of argument commit to the truth of the conclusions Winch draws. 
What, if anything, he shows on this line of argument simply doesn't establish 
his case. 
Part III 
Yet, having shown the defectiveness of this one line of argument,· having 
shown that the existence of a teleology of the observed does not per se pre­
suppose its adoption by the observer who s.eeks a scientific understanding of the 
observed's behavior, does not by any means wholly dispose of Winch's general 
thesis. There is, as I have mentioned, a second main theme, or line of argument, 
which is threaded through the work and which must also be considered. If we 
construe the line of argument examined in the preceding part as an attempt to 
establish a positive thesis, we may profitably, I think, treat this second line as an 
attempt to establish a corresponding negative thesis. Thus, the argument already 
considered may be thought of as one which is for the adoption of a philosophical 
method as candidate for the office of methodology of the social sciences. 
Correspondingly, his second theme may be thought of as an argument against 
what I shall from now on simply call the scientific method as such a candidate. 
The two lines of argument are closely related and, as I've indicated, Winch 
himself shows no particular interest in disentangling them. But they do not at all 
come to the same thing and they require independent refutation as well as 
independent establishment. 
It will shorten our treatment of this second theme if attention is confined 
primarily to just one kind of social phenomena: linguistic behavior or activity. 
It is clear that the case of linguistic behavior, of language as a social institution, 
figures with surpassing prominence in Winch's own treatment. It has, of course, 
figured centrally in many discussions ranging over the literature on similar 
controversies; and, in any case, I should not be inclined to challenge the general-
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izability, of what might be established in the present context for linguistic 
behavior, to other social phenomena. If we confine our attention to language 
and linguistic behavior, the argument may be seen to be one construable in 
terms of what Quine calls radical trans/ateability. 6 If we were to generalize 
from linguistic to non-linguistic social behavior, we should have to find some 
suitable term other than <translateability' to apply to the general problem or else 
widen our notion of 'translation' or of 'language' so as to render them applicable 
to what are now thought of as non-linguistic social or meaningful phenomena. 
But this is a problem or no overriding severity; for present purposes, we may 
assume that it is solvable, and not allow it to detain us. 
To begin with, let us also take as unproblematic Quine's characterization of 
the nature of radical translation. He remarks of that intrepid social scientist, the 
linguist, that his task is "the recovery" of a person's language "from his 
currently observed responses11 (op. cit., p. 28). The linguist "unaided by an 
interpreter is out to penetrate and translate a language hitherto unknown. All 
the objective data he has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging on the 
natives' surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the 
native" (ibid.). Still, not all types of translation are germane. Translations 
between kindred languages may be helped by the occurrences of verbal cognates 
and between unrelated languages, aid might be afforded-if there has been 
previous contact-by "traditional equations" based on other shared items of 
culture. No, as Quine puts it, "What is relevant rather to our purposes is 
radical translation, i.e., translation of the language of a hitherto untouched 
people" (ibid. ). 
Having given this characterization, Quine devotes the next 50 pages of his 
book to the vicissitudes of radical translation-tirelessly drawing morals from and 
brilliantly illuminating an amazing number and variety of, quite general, 
epistemological issues, but nevertheless showing that the linguist proceeds by 
employing the scientific method: that is, he frames empirical hypotheses about 
the meanings of the native's vocalizations under conditions which he (the 
linguist) sets, and he (the linguist) checks these hypotheses by arranging a 
variety of test situations and circumstances whose outcomes he (the linguist) 
observes. 
Now, the relevance of the work of Quine, and others similarly disposed., to 
Winch's thesis is clear. Winch's thesis may be construed simply as the view that 
radical translation is impossible-not merely Lerribly difficult, notice-but 
logically impossible; to attempt it would be, to use his word, to engage i n  a 
"misbegotten" enterprise necessarily doomed to failure. 
It is likewise clear from the organization of his own book, that Winch would 
not linger to quarrel over the truth or falsity of the early putatively empirical 
hypotheses of the linguist. He would, in fact, attack the enterprise at a more 
profound level by challenging the very sense of a putative hypothesis like, 
H1: '' 'Gavagai' means the same as 'Rabbit'." 
For, Winch claims, the sense of the occurrences in such hypotheses of terms like 
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'means' and particularly 1 'the same', is precisely what is fundamentally at issue. 
To assume that one can use such terms in conformance wilh lhe teleology of the 
observer, i.e., with meanings governed by the rules of the observer's language, 
is, he would say, obviously to beg the question . The way to get to understand 
the naiive's language is by learning it in approximately the same way the native 
did; that is, by adopting the teleology, not of the observer, but of the observed­
by engaging in behavior rule-governed by the native 's linguistic rules. Just this 
was the burden of the argument examined in the preceding part of this essay. 
But, in fact, Winch is also urging something beyond this: He is claiming that 
there is no other method which can yield an understanding of the native's 
language; in particular, that no application of the scien tific method, as in the 
procedure indicated above of radical translation, can possibly do so. 
The outline of this second major theme or line oC argument of Winch's, 
then, may be presented fairly briefly. The first step consists in pointing out that 
certain fundamental processes such as judgments of identity (which, on the level 
of linguistic behavior, are represented by the occurrence in statements of terms 
like 'the same') are rule governed processes. That is to say, what will count as 
the same in any context is decidable only relative to some set of rules. Again, on 
the linguistic level, this would amount to the assertion that the meaning of terms 
like 'the same' is established only by the rules of the language Lo which they 
belong. Step two, of this "free" reconstruction of Winch's ar�ment consists in 
pointing out that the rules governing, say, judgments of identity-a.nd their 
linguistic counterparts-are not likely to be the same for both the language of the 
observer and that of the observed. Even more tellingly, in this step of the argu­
ment, it is being held that there is no way, in principle, for the radical translator 
to tell whether the rules are the same rules or are not. While for him Lo assume 
that they are the same is to beg the question. 
I 
· Step three is now a thrust of the other horn: if the radical translator does 
not assume that they are the same, then he can frame no meaningful empirical 
hypothesis at all. For what is true of terms like 'means' and 'the same', is 
equally true of such key terms as 'name', 'predicate', 'sentence', and 'term' and, 
most crucially, 'rule' itself. Accordingly, if, for example, the radical translator 
does not assume that 'Gavagai' is, in the native's language, a name or a predicate 
or a rule-governed vocalization, in some sense of these categories sufficiently 
like their sense in the native's language, then no meaningful hypothesis of 
translation can be framed at all. We can perhaps clarify this important step 
of Winch's argument a little more by following through on an example. Con­
sider the putative hypothei>is, 
H2: " 'Gavagai' means Rabbit." 
But whether 'Gavagai' does mean Rabbit is obviously dependent in some 
measure on what 'means' means-indeed, whether or not H2 is a nonsensical 
locution depends upon what 'means' means. But (Winch would presumably 
continue) 'Gavagai' can't mean at all in the English sense of this latter term, for 
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'means', has its meaning elucidated or determined relative only to the rules of 
English-rules which have no applicability in the native language; while, on the 
other hand, the term 'Gavagai' has its meaning elucidated or determined relative 
only to the rules of the native language-in particular, relative only to rules 
determining the meaning of whatever native counterpart there may be for the 
English word 'meaning.' Thus if the translator does not assume that the rules of 
the native language are sufficiently like the rules of English, he cannot even 
frame an intelligible hypothesis about the meaning of native vocalizations. 
Winch, ·of course, does not couch the premises of his argument in just this 
fashion; nevertheless, I think this is a fair (perhaps even more than fair) presenta­
tion of their import. In any case, the conclusion of his argument is, as indicated 
above, that the scientific method is inapplicable in coming to an understanding 
of alien language behavior-that is, in the present context, his conclusion 
amounts to denying the possibility of radical translation. 
How good is this argument'? It is wrong-headed though de,ep. It is a profound 
argument in the sense of having implications not only for current controversies 
in the Philosophy of Social Science and the Philosophy of History, for current 
controversies about Ethics and about intentional phenomena generally, but also 
implications for the problem of the nature of philosophical analysis itself-and 
in particular for the problem of what kind of pursuit Ordinary Language Philos­
ophy turns out to be. However, I must here restrict myself to delineating the 
wrong-headedness of Winch's argument rather than elucidate its profundity in 
this respect. I did, though, want to indicate, even if scantily, the broad grounds 
I have for thinking that his arguments (and, indeed, the Winch-like arguments of 
others which have been flourishing in a recent spate of articles and books) do 
merit very close attention. 
Still, the arguments are wrong-headed. To begin with, it should be noted 
that the task of translating a language is not the same as the task of learning a 
language. Patently, the criteria of adequacy in translation are different from the 
criteria of adequacy in learning a language. What is involved in seeing this is 
very much like, if not identical with, what was involved in noting the equivocal 
senses of the term 'understanding' which were encountered in the preceding 
section. No doubt, we have "learned a language" only if we have gained the kind 
of understanding of it which is identical with directly experiencing behaving in 
conformance with its rules. On the other hand, if coming to undersland a 
language is among the criteria of adequate translation at all it is surely not in the 
sense of understanding just mentioned, but rather, one of the other senses of 
that equivocal term. 
Consider again the hy!Pothesis of translation 
H1 : " 'Gavagai' means the same as 'Rabbit'." 
In the first place it should be noted that the native word, 'Gavagai' does not 
occur in H1. And this, in itself, is enough to make us look more doubtfully at 
the 2nd and 3rd steps of the line of argument above-for both of these steps 
appear to depend strongly on the assumption thal native words occur in (i.e., 
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are used in) the linguist's hypotheses. In the second place, any obscurity about 
the term 'means' as such which occurs in H1 is considerably lessened as soon as 
it is recognized that H1 in toto is appropriately analyzable for the linguist into 
H 11: " 'Gavagai' in Language J may be translated as 'Rabbit' in Language E." 
For, this is after all what the translator is hypothesizing. To be sure, such an 
analysis immediately reveals the burden which is placed by the linguist on the 
notion of translation itself and the linguist must address himself to making that 
notion clear. Nonetheless, even in advance of bnving done so we are free of at 
least one muddle: H '1 is a meta-linguistic assertion relative both to the native's 
language and to the target language. Accordingly, the locution 'may be trans­
lated by' need be a term of neither of these languages and may be, indeed 
ordinarily will be, a technical term of the science of linguistics instead. This 
possibility, I believe, pulls most of the remaining teeth of the 2nd and 3rd 
premises. 
The task of clearing up the technical notion of translation of course still 
remains. And though it is happily not within the province of this essay to do 
anything definitive about that, I can indicate that there appear to be ways of 
clearing it up which would give no sustenance whatever to Winch-like positions. 
Thus, criteria of adequate tianslation might be so couched that H'i is held to be 
confirmed when under certain stimulus conditions, say the visual presentation of 
a rabbit, a representative native, or a majority of the natives, respond by 
uttering 'Gavagai'. While under those same conditions (note, that 'same' here is 
relative to the scientist's teleology), a representative speaker-or the majority of 
speakers-of the target language respond with the utterance 'Rabbit'. If this, 
obviously too simple-but, for the present purposes, serviceable clarification of 
the import of H'1 is accepted, then the empirically testable character of the 
hypothesis is abundantly manifest. 
In any case there is no reason for restricting the linguist to just one notion of 
translation. The science might well utilize a family of such notions each appro· 
priate to some different aim of the scientist and each differing from the others 
in, say, the degree of stringency set by the conditions of adequacy for trans­
lations of that type. In this light, then, Winch's 2nd or negative line of argument 
seems wholly uncompelling too. Radical translation is possible. 
Are there, then, any recourses which are available to Winch for meeting 
these objections to his argument when that argument is construed as one about 
radical translation? His book suggests that he might take either of the following 
two: 
1. He might say that the notion of radical translation construed, as above, in 
terms of a linguist's empirical hypotheses of translation, does achieve some 
cogency; but only at the cost of relinquishing its claim to constitute an 
inquiry into what are peculiarly social phenomena. For, as now construed, 
such an inquiry could only give us an understanding of language behavior 
from the "outside." But for Winch to take this recourse would be tanta-
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mount to a retreat to the argument assessed and found wanting in part II 
of this essay. 
2. He might on the other hand attack the cogency of this notion of trans­
laieability by pointing out two, connected, ostensible weaknesses. Both 
appear to draw support from Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of 
translation. One of them is that even if our criteria for adequate trans­
lation were to be a condition as weak as the one which Quine calls 
'stimulus synonymy', one could never, in principle, be sure that the 
translational hypot!hesis being accepted was true. The other weakness 
Winch might impute is the closely related one that for every translational 
hypothesis which the linguist might formulate, it is demonstrable that it 
would be possible to formulate a second hypothesis, incompatible with the 
first, which was yet not only confirmed by all the evidence now con­
firming the first, but also, in principle, such that every confirming or dis­
confirming test we might ever make of the first would also be, respectively, 
a confirming or disconfirming test of the second. 
Yet, I think that these possible Winchian gambits for meeting the objections 
I have raised in part II also come to naught. The first gambit is replied to by 
pointing out that our never being sure of the truth of translational hypothesis 
beyond the possibility of error, is simply a condition of every empirical hypo­
thesis. It could only be construed as a weakness by begging the very question of 
whether our knowledge of social phenomena must be of a kind other than that 
vouchsafed through applications of the scientific method. 
The second gambit is considerably more complex and requires, perhaps, a 
much more complicated reply. Still this reply has, I think, already been given 
both by Quine toward the end of his discussion of radical translation (op. cit., 
sections 15 and 16, especially pp. 71-79), and by N . .Goodman in his article· 
"The Way the World Is;"7 I can remind you of something their (fuller) answers 
have in common by quoting the apothcgem which occurs near the close of 
Goodman's essay-although he is addressing himself to mysticism there, his 
remark is obviously relevant here as well: "The answer to the question 'what is 
the way the world is? What are the ways the world is?' is not a shush, but a 
chatter." (p. 55) 
In any case, one point about the discussion of radical translation must, 
perhaps, be noted here in a little greater detail. It is this: although T believe the 
account of translational hypotheses given above to be compatible with Quine's 
treatment of such hypotheses (and, indeed, the rebuttal of a Winchian argument 
this account contains, likewise to be compatible with Quine's views of such 
hypotheses) I am not, of course, in that account attempting any gloss of the 
recondite problem of the indeterminacy of translation. There already exists 
a long and complex literature on this latter prolblem-a literature to which Quine 
himself makes notable additions from time to time. But, both the original 
treatment of the concept of Indeterminacy of Translation (and some of its 
companion concepts, such as that of the inscrutability of terms) makes it 
abundantly clear that Quine's views do not bulwark separatist positions in 
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social science. One supposes that the separatist point is that the meaning of 
a social act (such as a speech act) is not accessible from the "outside" of the 
"language community" in which it takes place (i.e., it is not accessible to 
scientific investigation). But this separatist view is surely not the burden of 
Quine's contentions on translational indeterminacy. The main thrust of his 
position here-as elsewhere, faithfully, in his philosophical essays-is to deny 
that there is anything which is the meaning of the native's speech act (utterance) 
to be conveyed in a translation. Whatever the reasons may be for calling a 
translation, on Quine's view, indeterminate, they are not those of failure to 
carry the meaning of the native's original utterance-failure to convey, or be 
able to unequivocally pick out what the native did really mean-for there is, on 
Quine's view, no such meaning. The question of what the real meaning of 
native utterance is, is precisely the kind of question "whose very significance" 
Quine "would put in doubt. "8 As he says, the dubiousness of the significance of 
just such questions is "what I am getting at in arguing the indeterminacy of 
translation." (ibid. ) In short, indeterminacy of translation is a function of the 
empirical, or evidential, underdetermination of what I have been delineating as 
translational hypotheses-a characteristic which such hypotheses share with 
hypotheses of the non-social sciences-indeed, with all scientific hypotheses. It 
is not a function of our inability, except in a Pickwickian sense, to determine 
scientifically the meaning of an utterance. 
All of the above considerations have brought us, finally, "by a commodious 
vicus of recirculation" back to the riddle and answer with which this essay 
began. There is a point which I hope the riddle makes: The history of 
philosophy, indeed, intellectual history in general, has taught us that to define, 
or to characterize, the determining conditions of anything, does not, fortunately, 
or perhaps unfortu!'lately � entail the existence of a thing which meets those 
conditions. In the final analysis, it seems to me that Winch has, perhaps clearly 
enough, specified the conditions under which the correct answer to the question 
"How shall we investigate social phenomena?" would be the one he gives. I 
think though we are fortunate that those conditions are not fulfilled-and we 
can, if we feel so inclined regard his idea of "no social science" as being a 
mildly humorous one. It is reassuring to be able to recognize calmly that there 
are some conundrums whose clearly correct answer is "A flying lox box." We 
can agree to this and still feel serene in the knowledge that there are no flying 
lox boxes. 
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